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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred When It Granted Forbes' Motion To Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it granted Forbes' motion to dismiss, 
concluding that, because Forbes had received a withheld judgment in 2003, 
application of the current version of I.C. § 19-2604(3), which would not allow 
dismissal of his case, violates constitutional prohibitions against the ex post facto 
application of laws. (R., pp. 58-66.) The district court erred because application 
of I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not violate the prohibition against the ex post facto 
application of laws. Forbes asserts that the district court was correct in its ruling, 
arguing both that I.C. § 19-2604 should not be applied retroactively to those who 
had previously received a withheld judgment and that application of the statute to 
Forbes violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. (Respondent's brief, 
pp. 8-19.) The state contends that Forbes' arguments are without merit and in 
light of the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Hardwick, Docket 
No. 37178-2009, Opinion No. 31 (Idaho, March 17, 2011), the district court 
should be reversed. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Granted Forbes' Motion To Dismiss 
Forbes' argument is threefold. First, he argues that the state has waived 
any claim on appeal that the 2006 amendment to I.C. § 19-2604(3) should be 
applied retroactively. (Respondent's brief, pp. 7-8.) He next argues that the 
2006 amendment to I. C. § 19-2604(3) should not be applied retroactively to 
anyone who had been granted a withheld judgment prior to the effectiveness 
1 
date of the amendment. (Respondent's brief, pp. 8-11.) Finally, Forbes asserts 
that application of the 2006 amendment to LC. § 19-2604(3) violates the 
constitutional prohibition against the ex post facto application of laws. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 11-19.) Each of Forbes' assertions is without merit. 
1. The State Has Not Waived Any Claim On Appeal That The 2006 
Amendment To LC.§ 19-2604(3) Should Be Applied Retroactively 
Forbes asserts that the state has waived any claim on appeal that the 
2006 amendment to LC. § 19-2604(3) should be applied retroactively. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 7-8.) Because Forbes never raised this issue to the 
district court and the district court did not make its ruling on this basis, the state 
was not required as appellant to even address this issue. Forbes' assertion that 
the state waived an issue raised for the first time in Respondent's brief is without 
merit. 
Forbes initially filed the motion to dismiss in the district court. (R., pp. 50-
51.) In his motion, he requested the court "pursuant to the terms of his withheld 
judgment and under Idaho Code§ 19-2604(1 )" to dismiss the matter and restore 
his civil rights. (R., p. 51.) Forbes did not file any supporting memorandum or 
brief. In its response, the state argued that application of the 2006 amendment 
of I.C. § 19-2604(3) to Forbes was not an ex post facto violation. (R., pp. 52-54.) 
The district court, after hearing arguments from both the state and the defense, 
dismissed Forbes' case on the grounds that "I.C. § 19-2604 violates the Ex Post 
Facto clause as applied to the defendant in this case." (R., p. 66.) 
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Forbes' motion and response from the state below primarily addressed 
whether I.C. § 19-2604(3) violated the prohibition against the ex post facto 
application of laws. Likewise, the district court only ruled on whether I.C. § 19-
2604(3) violated the prohibition against the ex post facto application of laws. 1 
Whether I.C. § 19-2604(3) should, as a matter of statutory interpretation, be 
applied retroactively to anyone who received a withheld judgment prior to the 
effective date of its amendment is a separate issue, not previously raised or 
ruled upon below. It is, in essence, an alternative basis for affirming the district 
court's decision, raised for the first time in the Respondent's brief. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 8-11.) 
Forbes has cited no authority for the proposition that an appellant must 
anticipate and address all alternative bases for a trial court's ruling. (See 
generally Respondent's brief.) It is nonsensical to argue that every time an 
alternative basis for affirming a district court's decision is raised in the 
respondent's brief, that the respondent automatically prevails because the issue 
was neither raised below nor argued in the appellant's brief. There is no reason 
why an appellant would argue in its appellant's brief an issue neither raised nor 
decided below. For this reason, the state has not waived any claim that the 
2006 amendment to LC. § 19-2604 should be applied retroactively. 
1 In its analysis, the district court held that the statute was "retroactive in [its] 
application." (R., p. 63.) This finding was made, however, in the context of an ex 
post facto analysis and not in a separate statutory construction analysis. (See, 
R., pp. 61-66.) 
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2. The 2006 Amendment To I.C. § 19-2604 Is Not Retroactive And 
May Be Applied To Forbes 
Forbes asserts that the amendment to I.C. § 19-2604 should not be given 
retroactive effect to those who had previously been granted a withheld judgment 
prior to the effectiveness date of the amendment. (Respondent's brief, pp. 8-11.) 
Forbes' assertion is erroneous because a retroactive analysis is inapplicable in 
this case. 
"A retrospective or retroactive law is one which takes away or impairs 
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes 
a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or 
considerations already past." Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Transp. 147 Idaho 257, 
262, 207 P.3d 988, 993 (2009). !n Idaho, a statute is not applied retroactively 
unless there is clear legislative intent to that effect. Id. "However, in the 
absence of an express declaration of legislative intent, a statute, which is 
remedial or procedural in nature, and which does not create, enlarge, diminish, 
or destroy contractual or vested rights, is generally held not to be retroactive, 
even though it was enacted subsequent to the events to which it applies." !sl 
A remedial law is one which pertains to or affects a remedy, as 
distinguished from a statute which affects or modifies a substantive right or duty. 
Blacks Law Dictionary 1293 (6th ed. 1990), citing Perkins v. Willamette 
Industries, Inc., 542 P.2d 473 (Or. 1975). Because I.C. § 19-2604 merely offers 
a remedy for certain individuals who have been convicted of a crime, it is a 
remedial statute. See also State v. Hanes, 139 Idaho 392, 394, 79 P.3d 1070, 
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1072 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting that expungement is an "extraordinary remedy." 
(emphasis added)). 
Further, because the statute does not "create, enlarge, diminish, or 
destroy contractual or vested rights" it is "held not [to] be retroactive." Wheeler, 
147 Idaho at 262, 207 P.3d at 993. Because Forbes did not have contractual or 
vested rights in the statute as it existed at the time that he pied guilty, it is "held 
not [to] be retroactive" as applied to him. See State v. Koester, 127 P.3d 784, 
786 (Wash. App. 2006) (holding that "eligibility to vacate a record is not a 
substantive right, but a period of legislative grace that is subject to the control of 
the legislature until all of the conditions are satisfied. Unless all of the conditions 
have been met, and vesting has occurred, the legislature may change the 
remedy granted by the statute."); Euclid v. Sattler, 756 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio App. 8 
Dist., 2001) ("A right cannot be regarded as vested in the constitutional sense 
unless it amounts to something more than an expectation of a future benefit or 
interest."). 
Because I.C. § 19-2604(3) is a remedial law rather than a substantive law, 
and because Forbes had no vested interest in the statute as it existed at the time 
that he was sentenced, the application of the law to him is not retroactive. This 
court should apply the law as it existed at the time that Forbes filed his motion to 
dismiss and hold that I.C. § 19-2604 is not retroactive as applied to him. 
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3. Application Of The 2006 Amendment To I.C. § 19-2604 To Forbes 
Does Not Violate The Constitutional Prohibition Against The Ex 
Post Facto Application Of Laws 
As previously discussed in Respondent's brief, application of the 2006 
amendment to I.C. § 19-2604 to Forbes does not violate the constitutional 
prohibition against the ex post facto application of laws. 
The recent case of State v. Hardwick, Docket No. 37178-2009, Opinion 
No. 31 (Idaho, March 17, 2011 ), is dispositive. Hardwick pied guilty to enticing 
children over the internet in February 2005, was granted a withheld judgment, 
and was placed on probation for five years. Hardwick, Slip. op. at p. 1. In 2009, 
Hardwick moved to terminate his probation, withdraw his guilty plea, and to have 
the case dismissed. kl at p. 2. The district court denied the motion based upon 
the 2006 amendment to I.C. § 19-2604 and held that the amendment did not 
violate the ex post facto clauses of either the state or federal constitutions. kl 
On appeal, Hardwick argued that the amendment increased the punishment for 
his crime and thus constituted an ex post facto violation. kl at p. 3. The Idaho 
Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the 2006 amendment was nonpunitive, 
and therefore it was not an ex post facto violation. kl at p. 5. 
Like Hardwick, Forbes was granted a withheld judgment prior to the 
amendment to I.C. § 19-2604. Like Hardwick, Forbes moved to have his case 
dismissed after I.C. § 19-2604 was amended, contending that application of the 
amendment to him constituted punishment and was an ex post facto violation. 
And like Hardwick, application of the amendment to Forbes is not punishment 
and, thus, is not an ex post facto violation. 
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For these reasons, Forbes' arguments are unavailing and the district court 
erred in concluding that application of the amendment to I.C. § 19-2604(3) 
violated ex post facto prohibitions. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order granting Forbes' motion to dismiss. 
DATED this 28th day of March 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of March 2011, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached APPELLANT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
EAK/pm 
7 


